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Unfair Labor Practices: The Picketing Restrictions Imposed By
The 1959 Taft-Hartley Amendments-In the first appellate court
decision1 interpreting the restrictions on recognitional and organiza-
tional picketing enacted by the Labor-Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act of 1959,2 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
furnished some guideposts for the NLRB and the courts in applying
this complex statute to the host of cases that are already arising under
it.
In 1957 a majority of the employees of the Stork Club in New
York began picketing to protest the alleged discharge of certain em-
ployees for engaging in union activities and to compel the employer
to recognize and bargain with the two uncertified unions that repre-
sented them. The picketing continued until January, 1960, when the
employer filed an unfair labor practice charge under Section.8(b) (7)
(C).3 Upon notice of the charge, the unions on the advice of counsel
immediately notified the employer and the NLRB that they were no
longer picketing to compel the employer to recognize and bargain with
them, but were picketing for "informational" purposes only, i.e., to
advise the public that the Stork Club had no contract with the unions,
"McLeod v. Chefs, Cooks, Pastry Cooks and Assistants, Local 89, Hotel and
Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union, AFL-CIO, 280
F. 2d 760 (2d Cir. 1960).
2 Section 704(c), 73 Stat. 544 (1959). This section amends section 8(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended 29 U.S.C. 158(b) 1960, and provides
that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
"(7) to picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause to be
picketed, any employer where an object thereof is forcing or requiring an
employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representa-
tive of his employees, or forcing or requiring the employees of an employer
to accept or select such labor organization as their collective bargaining repre-
sentative, unless such labor organization is currently certified as the represen-
tative of such employees: (A) where the employer has lawfully recognized
in accordance with this Act any other labor organization and a question con-
cerning representation may not appropriately be raised under section 9(c) of
this Act, (B) where within the preceding twelve months a valid election
under Section 9(c) of this Act has been conducted, or (C) where such
picketing has been conducted without a petition under section 9(c) being
filed within a reasonable period of time not to exceed thirty days from the
commencement of such picketing: Provided, That when such a petition has
been filed the Board shall forthwith, without regard to the provisions of sec-
tion 9(c) (1) or the absence of a showing of a substantial interest on the part
of the labor organization, direct an election in such unit as the Board finds to
be appropriate and shall certify the results thereof: Provided further, That
nothing in this subparagraph (C) shall be construed to prohibit any picketing
or other publicity for the purpose of truthfully advising the public (including
consumers) that an employer does not employ members of, or have a contract
with, a labor organization, unless an effect of such picketing is to induce any
individual employed by any other person in the course of his employment, not
to pick up, deliver or transport any goods or not to perform any services.
Nothing in this paragraph (7) shall be construed to permit any act which
would otherwise be an unfair labor practice under this section 8(b)."
a Ibid. Neither union had filed a representation petition under section 9 (c).
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and that its employees did not enjoy union wages, hours and work-
ing conditions. Such picketing is permitted under the second proviso
of Section 8(b) (7) (C), and the picket signs were then changed so as
to come within the language of that proviso. However, upon applica-
tion by the Stork Club for a temporary injunction pending a decision
by the NLRB, the Federal District Court4 found reasonable cause to
believe that one of the unions' objectives remained that of employer
recognition. The court reasoned that, since the picket signs stated that
the Stork Club did not have a union contract, it must follow that their
ultimate objective was to force the Stork Club to sign one with them.
Upon appeal, the Second Circuit held that the finding of the lower
court on this point was clearly erroneous. It rejected, in the absence
of independent evidence, the presumption that the unions' initial ob-
jectives persisted after the picket signs were changed and the unions
had notified the employer that they no longer were picketing for recog-
nition. The court stated:
To say that the carrying of signs stating that the employer has
no contract with the union is proof of recognitional picketing is
to ignore the letter and we think, the spirit of the statute.'
The court agreed, however, with the finding that there was reasonable
cause to believe that the picketing did induce individuals employed by
other employers to refuse to make their deliveries to the Stork Club.
In view of this unlawful effect, therefore, the court held that an in-
junction was properly issued, but ordered the lower court to modify
it so as to enjoin the picketing only during those hours of the day
when deliveries were most likely to occur.
Of the multitude of questions that ultimately must be resolved by
the NLRB and the courts as to the meaning and scope of Section
8(b) (7), the Stork Club decision gives some indication as to the direc-
tion that may be taken in answering at least two of them. First, by
what standards will be "objectives" of the picketing by uncertified
unions be determined? Secondly, if the picketing is found to be the
legally permissible "informational" type, is it nevertheless proscribed
if "an effect" is to induce any employee of another employer not to
make a delivery or to perform other services, whether or not the union
intends such an effect?
It seems clear that "dual purpose" picketing, i.e., for publicity as
well as for recognitional or organizational objectives, will not be
allowed, since the section speaks in terms of an object, and not neces-
sarily the sole object, of the picketing.6 There has been much discus-
4 McLeod v. Chefs, Cooks, Pastry Cooks and Assistants, Local 89, Hotel and
Restaurant Employees Union, AFL-CIO, 181 F. Supp. 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
5 Supra note 1, at 763-764.
6 Phillips v. International Ladies Garment Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 45 LRRIM
2363 (1959) ; Elliott v. Sapulpa Typographical Union, 45 LRRM 2400 (1959) ;
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sion in the cases that have arisen thus far, however, as to whether
the section refers only to present or immediate objectives, or whether
it proscribes picketing even if the union's ultimate goal is recognition
or organization.7 A number of Federal District Courts have denied
temporary injunctions because of this alleged distinction, holding that
Congress could not have intended to ban purely informational picket-
ing, albeit the hope of the picketing union is that such tactics will
carry it closer to ultimate recognition, which presumably is the goal
of all unions8 As stated by the court in Brown v. Department and
Specialty Store Employees Union, Local 1265:
... the court should not allow the ultimate purpose of any union
to organize all unorganized employees in a particular industry
where it functions to be confused with immediate objects spe-
cifically proscribed by Congress.9
However, one eminent labor law authority suggests that the picketing
union's objective be treated as a question of fact, with the union hav-
ing the burden of rebutting the presumption that its immediate goal is
recognition. He suggests that this burden can be met by showing that
the labor conditions of which the union is complaining are:
... such a substantial threat to existing union standards in other
shops as to support a finding that the union has a genuine
interest in compelling the improvement of the labor conditions
or eliminating the competition, even though the union does not
become the bargaining representative.10
In most cases, it will be extremely difficult to establish what the union's
objectives actually are. A carefully worded picket sign in the language
Penello v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 400, 45 LRRM 2726 (1960);
Compton v. Local 346, International Leather Goods Union, AFL-CIO, 184 F.
Supp. 210 (Puerto Rico, 1960).
E.g., one trial examiner held that a union which initially sought recognition
but changed its picket signs so as to meet the test of immunity under the
second proviso of Section 8(b) (7) (C) must be given the benefit of a pre-
sumption that it is sincere in its resort to informational picketing, and that
such presumption is not overcome by contentions that the union may have
"vague and speculative hopes" of achieving recognition at some future date.
International Ladies Garment Workers Union and Saturn Sedran, Inc., Cases
Nos. 10-CB-1124, 10-CP-2 (1960).
8 Getreu v. Bartenders and Hotel and Restaurant Employees Union, Local 58, 181
F. Supp. 738 (N.D. Ind. 1960) ; Brown v. Department & Specialty Store Em-
ployees Union, Local 1265, 46 LRRM 2439 (1960). In Greene v. International
Typographical Union and Local 285, 186 F. Supp. 630 (D. Conn. 1960), the court
dismissed contempt proceedings against a union which had continued to picket
after an injunction had been issued, but had changed its picket signs to state
only that the employer did not have a contract with the union, and that the
picket line should not cause anyone to refuse to cross it. The court stated
that the NLRB's claim that the union was in contempt of the injunction
". .. confuses an immediate purpose with an ultimate objective and fails
properly to interpret congressional intention in dealing with these two things."
9 46 LRRM 2439, 2442 (1960).
10 Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Alnendments to the National Labor Relations Act,
44 Minn. L. Rev. 257, 267 (1959).
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of the second proviso will not save the union from the operation of
Section 8(b) (7), however, where the union's conduct and circum-
stances surrounding the picketing clearly indicate that its purpose is
more than mere "advising the public." In the first decision by the
Board applying Section 8(b) (7) (C), Local 239, Teamsters and Stan-
Jay Auto Parts and Accessories Corp.," the uncertified union picketed
with signs demanding recognition for two months prior to the effective
date of the section, and for some time thereafter. This fact, coupled
with the union's attempts to persuade the non-union employees to join
its ranks, and its proposal to the employer to sign a contract in return
for a cessation of picketing, lead the Board to conclude that the union's
later switch to "information only" picketing was not protected by the
second proviso.
Another question raised in the Stork Club case, which is discussed
by Judge Waterman in his concurring opinion, is what Congress meant
by the words "an effect," in prohibiting informational picketing in the
second proviso if "an effect of such picketing is to induce employees
of other employers not- to make pickups or deliveries or to perform
other services." As he interprets the majority opinion, the word "effect"
is emphasized and not the word "induce," so that if any one delivery
is deterred because of the picketing, regardless of the intent or ob-
jective of the union, the picketing becomes unlawful. He states that
Congress may have intended more than a mere "cause and effect" rela-
tionship, and that the union must be found to have intended to disrupt
deliveries or other services before is picketing is banned. At any rate,
he would not now construe the meaning of the language until after the
Board itself has had an opportunity to do so in this case.' 2
It is interesting to note, however, that the court here found reason-
able cause to believe that the Act was violated because of the testimony
of three truck drivers who stated that they saw the pickets, spoke to
no one, and decided not to make deliveries upon seeing the pickets at
the entrance of the Stork Club. As one writer has pointed out, if "an
effect" means "any effect," then one refusal to deliver may suffice to in-
validate the picketing, ".... but so aseptic a reading of the statute would
significantly reduce the utility of the proviso permitting informational
picketing."'13 Professor Cox is also of the view that the statute should
be liberally construed, and should not be invoked to prohibit picketing
on the basis of a few isolated instances of refusals by outside work-
ingmen to pickup and deliver.' 4
As to the intent factor, the Board seems to have adopted an objective
11127 NLRB No. 132, 46 LRRM 1123 (1960).12 Supra note 1, at 765-766.
13Dunau, A Preliminary Look at Section 8(b)(7), 48 Geo. L. J. 371, 378 (1959).
'4 Supra note 10, at 267.
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standard in the Stan-Jay Auto Parts case.15 It rejected the union's dis-
claimer of responsibility for the disruption of deliveries, holding that
there is no legislative history to justify so qualifying the word "effect."
The union reasonably should have anticipated that the picket line would
induce employees to refuse to cross it, said the Board, and the union
took no steps to insure that the picket line would not have this normal
effect. Therefore, the Board held that, whatever may have been the
union's subjective intent, at least objectively the picketing was intended
to disrupt services.
If the "normal effect" of the picket line is to deter outsiders from
crossing it, then it appears that the "intent" factor will be disposed of
as it was in the Stan-Jay Auto Parts case, and the primary question
in the Stork Club case and in future cases will be whether the effect is
"substantial," i.e., is the refusal of one, two, or three outside work-
men to cross the picket line sufficient to proscribe all informational
picketing? The answer to these and the myriad other questions involved
in Section 8(b) (7) remain to be determined by the Board and the
courts.
1 8  
JAMES A. KERN
Federal Income Taxation: Relation of Estate Tax Valuation
To Income Tax Basis-In 1939 plaintiffs, a brother and sister, in-
herited from their father 510 shares of stock in a closely held Brazilian
corporation. At the time of this acquisition they were respectively 15
and 12 years of age. The stock was valued by local appraisers at par
value which amounted to $11,857.50 when converted at the existing
exchange rate. The executors of the estate used this valuation for es-
tate tax purposes, but also submitted a consolidated balance sheet of the
company, showing the book value of the stock to be $273,686.40.
A deficiency was assessed against the executors in 1943. However,
the only upward valuation relating to the stock in question was an
$11,857.50 increase based upon the use of an incorrect conversion rate
in 1939. The stock was sold by the plaintiffs in 1947 for $258,948.20.
The basis used for computing long-term capital gain was $27,618.04.1
Subsequently a suit for refund was filed, wherein the plaintiffs con-
tended that the fair market value of the shares in 1939 was $331,418.40,
and thus in excess of the price realized at sale. They presented evidence
indicating that their alleged basis2 was, in fact, actual market value in
15 Supra note 11.
16 For a discussion of some of the other problems under Section 8(b) (7), see
McDermott, Recognstional and Organizational Picketing under Amendments
to the Taft-Hartley Act, 44 Marq. L. Rev. 1 (1960).
1 This figure is slightly higher than the amended estate tax valuation of $23,715,
however, the court offered no explanation for the increase.
2 Since the amount of $331,418.40 is considerably higher than the 1939 book
value, apparently the plaintiffs' evidence embodied more than this. The opinion
gives no indication as to what constituted the additional evidence.
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